

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

Def. Doc.# 2578

EXHIBIT # _____

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

AFFIDAVIT

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

My name is SASA, Hiroo. I am living now at No. 219, 1-chome, Nozawa-machi, Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

1. At present I am a member of the House of Councillors and I belong to the RYOKUFUKAI Party.

1. My relation with Mr. ARAKI, Sadao is such that we have never met each other by this time, except only once when at the occasion of a wedding ceremony of the daughter of my friend Mr. SHIMA, Ichiro, we were among the same company.

However, I feel it my duty as a critic and a historian to lay bare the truth about Mr. ARAKI which I heard directly from Prince KONOYE, Fumimaro and other people, and also the historical facts which were contained in the Political Chapter of the Annual Report of the Chuo Koron, and which were written by me from December, 1933 and published on the 1st of January, 1934.

Due to my publication entitled "Indigence of Politics" and scores of other historical, commentarily or critical books on politics and on matters concerning politics which I had written with an object of criticizing Fascism and thereby to restraint the military clique, I was regarded by the army circles to be an undersirous scholar and a critic. But I can say this that all the historical facts in those books were written as they were, and my argument and criticism was based on those historical facts.

Never had I once resorted to such despicable attitude of distorting the facts for the sake of using it as the means of attack.

Consequently, the Part I of my following statement contains the historical facts which I wrote on the aforementioned "Annual Report of the CHUO KORON", and Part II, the historical facts contained in my book "Tragic History of Political Affairs of SHOWA" and which had hitherto not been made public. In Part III, I shall relate some social facts which I had learned in connection with Education Minister ARAKI's attitude toward one or two incidents which took place in publishing world and academic circles.

Part 1. 1. In connection with the "Annual Report of the CHUO KORON."

In January, 1933, when the committee meeting of the League of Nations on the Manchurian Incident showed hopelessness of coming to an agreement of a

compromising negotiation based on the provisions of Paragraph 3, of Article 15 of the Regulation, revealing at the same time a marked tendency that Japan had to submit herself to moral accusation as the result of preparation by the said committee of a report with a recommendation, based upon the provisions of Article 4 of the same Regulation.

The views of War Minister ARAKI was as follows. I shall quote here an article on the January 31st issue of the Tokyo Asahi, which gave the following report.

"There is no need of immediate withdrawal"
-War Minister ARAKI talks Japan's attitude toward the League of Nations.-

(Former part omitted.) "Japan does not have to immediately withdraw from the League if a recommendation based on Paragraph 4 of the Regulation were to be decided. Japan has heaps of things that she has to talk to the League. If the League act in such a way that Japan could no longer stay with it, then she can walk out of openly and squarely. Until then, Japan must do everything in her power to enlighten the League. This is a policy of Japan which had been clearly determined since before the departure of Plenipotentiary MATSUOKA, to whom no instruction of tedious nature is needed at this stage. All Japan has to say to the League is that our policy is one and consistent from the beginning, and leave the rest to the skilled activity of the diplomatic people on the spot." (the rest omitted)

Needless to say that this remarks drew attention of the people as being an expressed view of the War Minister in opposition to general the opinion that Japan should immediately withdraw from the League if the latter decided to apply the provisions of Paragraph 4 of the Regulation.

2. The Imperial Rescript after the withdrawal from the League was announced simultaneously with the dispatchment of the formal notification of withdrawal, a step which was not taken until our solicitation and other form of requests to the League were finally refused. My description in my book concerning this Imperial Rescript ran as follow:-

Japan even after the withdrawal clarified the principle of "being consistent in her efforts of cooperating henceforth with all the intentions toward peace," and further it is declared in the Rescript that "although Japan would tread along the predetermined path, she has no intention of ignoring from her bias toward the Far East, the good will of friendly nations." This Rescript is especially valuable in that it made clear the foundation on which to conduct the cooperative diplomacy of SHOWA. (The quotation in the above of the sentence of the Imperial Rescript was taken from the Extra Issue of the TOKYO NICHU NICHU dated March 27th, 1933.) This Rescript was granted after careful consultation with the Army and taking into consideration its intention. The Rescript was countersigned by War Minister ARAKI.

3. After the withdrawal from the League, an opinion that Japan should enhance the friendly relations among the neighboring nations was given rise among the diplomatic, business and military circles. The view of military and diplomatic

authorities that "Japan is ready to go into a military alliance with China if only China awakens to the situation," was reported. (OSAKA MAINICHI, June 24). Japan's policy of concluding an American Japanese Arbitration Treaty or a Mediation Treaty was reported. (YOMIURI, December 4). The Soviet-Japanese relation at that time was just as my description in my book, which was as follow:- "Diplomatic relation between the Soviet and Japan appeared as if approaching the ***, but on the other hand, a suggestion for an economic concert between the two countries is also-gaining ground throughout the diplomatic, business as well as the military circles. War Minister ARAKI in his advocacy for a Far Eastern Peace Conference referred to non-aggression between the Soviet and Japan. This could be taken as representing the attitude of the military authorities. (CHUO KORON Annual Report. Page 176) All of these reports underlay the diplomatic policy of Japan's so-called "Friendly Relations with the Good Neighborly Nations" (TOKYO ASAHI, September 17) at the earlier stage of HIROTA's Foreign Ministership. The diplomatic policy at that time was inclined to lay stress upon suppression of general commotion after the withdrawal and, thereby, upon mitigation of an anti-Japanese sentiment among powers. However, even if the policy contained in it such motive as this the expression of the principle of a peaceful diplomacy on the part of the army and diplomatic authorities gave a sense of relief to the general populace who welcomed it. Their sense of relief was further intensified when a formal announcement was made as to the result of the Five Minister Conference of the SAITO Cabinet, in which Ministers SAITO, TAKAHASHI, ARAKI, OSUMI and HIROTA decided to "base the diplomacy upon the spirit of international harmony, and to devise the means to promote the friendly relations among such neighborly countries as China, the U.S.A. and Russia in particular" (TOKYO ASAHI, October 21) The War Minister ARAKI's suggestion of a Far Eastern Peace Conference (as reported by all the leading newspapers) was made in FUKUI City and it was regarded an expression of War Minister's personal belief rather than a formal announcement of the army authorities. This suggestion purported to hold a conference among powers to debate upon Manchurian problems as the leading issue and upon other Far Eastern problems which had bearing upon international peace, and to settle all of those matters once for all. (Page 182 of the Annual Report). The Foreign Office declined to agree this suggestion on the ground that it was impracticable and that it was an act denouncing the Assia Monroe Doctrine. The reaction, of the foreign countries to this suggestion was almost imperceptible, and as a whole, the suggestion did not bring about any material result. Only I consider that it serves, to depict the views War Minister ARAKI.

Part 11. 1. In my book "The Tragic History of Politics of Showa" I wrote as follow. (Page 13 and 14)
 "At the earlier stage of the German-Soviet War, the German troops launched an incessant and irresistible attack and showed a distinguished valor in the field of battle which was worthy of a credit of being the most powerful army in West Europe. In fact it was enough to startle Japan and the whole world. An opinion was then overwhelmingly, prevailing among the army circles that Japan should rise in arms at that juncture. The opinion advocated that the Soviet Union will collapse within four or six weeks and that it presented a golden opportunity to Japan to seize Siberia. The opinion further insisted that it was possible that German influence might reach the Far East across Russia, that if such should realize, it would be a cause of great alarm to Japan and that Japan should obtain in hands what she could obtain before such contingency took place.

- (1) What a meanness, and what a baseness! One really feels to turn his face from this wretchedness. If Japan should resort to such means, Japan would not be able to show her cause of justice to the Soviet with whom she had just concluded a neutrality pact, to say nothing of Japan's infidelity to Germany with whom she was in alliance. This opinion was mainly advocated by the people of Alliance Group and German Section of army who, while being familiar with Germany, did not know much about the Soviet Union, and it was not the opinion of the Alliance Criticizing Group or of the people who were thoroughly acquainted with the Soviet.

More particularly, the generals of so-called KODO Group (Imperial Way) were in such state of mind that a war should not be waged without the cause of justice. That a war should not be fought unless it had sufficient cause of justice, and that the war itself was of such nature that it could be waged by the strength of her own, much less a war for mercenariness. That why did they not realize the fact that the Soviet-Japan neutrality pact had only recently been ratified by His Majesty."

- (2) This was very fair and just opinion. In fact I thanked Heaven and Earth that Japan was still sound because of this opinion. The above (1) were the contents of the story of Premier KONOE when he explained to me at the end of June, 1931, of the detailed internal conditions of the army circles.

The next (2) was a correct description of what Lieutenant-General OBATA, Binshiro and Lieutenant-General YAMAGAWA, Heisuke told me when I, as a journalist had the pleasure of visiting them, General OBATA on July 1st, 1931 at his house in SHIMOKITAZAWA (Tokyo) and General YAMAGAWA on July 3rd, 1931 at his house in YOYOGI (Tokyo) As the opinions of the two Generals on that occasion were so perfectly identical that I surmised from it that the opinions might be the results of their previous talks with the so-called KODO (Imperial Way) Group Generals such as General ARAKI, General MASAKI and Lieutenant-

General YAMAOKA, I asked them whether they had recently met the above three generals. They said they had gathered every now and then, and then they said with forced smile that the army authorities getting annoyingly censorious over their gatherings.

It meant, then, that the above was an agreed opinion and conclusion of those several generals. I thought this opinion would give an effective support to the efforts of many of the admirers of those generals, both in the War Office and the General Staff, who, while remaining in obscurity or otherwise camouflaging themselves, were zealously engaged in settlement of the China Incident and subsequently in successful conclusion of the America-Japan peace negotiation. That is why it drove me into a mood of thanking to the Heaven and Earth.

2. On page 33 of my above-mentioned book wherein the army purification movement was closely studied, there is also a description to the following effects:

"General UGAKI and General HOMMA were the members of this group, and the movement of NAKANO, AMANO and HATOYAMA, aiming at the downfall of TOJO, seemed to have maintained certain contact with this group.

In contrast to this, the group of generals such as MASAKI, ARAKI, YANAGAWA, and OBATA manifested a clear character of its own. They maintained an attitude of absolute opposition to both the incident and the great war. It was manifested in an attempt of General YANAGAWA prior to the fall of Nanking."

Above was a well known fact among those well-informed people who had made sincere efforts in the study of the undisclosed phase of the state of affairs, but personally, thanks to a relation that his father was a good friend of my father, I had an opportunity of obtaining the detailed informations from Prince KONOE, who had returned from the U.S.A. after attending the meeting of the Pacific Problems Research Council. My description was based on those informations.

After the withbreak of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7th, 1937, Prince KONOE made a determination of preventing the expansion of this incident. Then the Prince had several contacts with various generals, exchanged views with them, and in 1941, strived to accomplish the America-Japan peace negotiation, and had contacts and cooperated with the negotiation. All of these will offer a ground on which truth of the above statement can be verified.

It was Prince KONOE who, while being the Premier of his First Cabinet, ordered to release General MASAKI, who had been kept in custody on a suspicion of having been concerned in the February 26 Incident. It was also the same Prince KONOE who told me of his heartfelt sympathy to Education Minister ARAKI when the latter vehemently objected from the point of view of international law as well as humanity to the bombing of several cities of China, and had a hot discussion with some cabinet members at the cabinet meeting.

During the period of his First Cabinet, Prince KONOE opined that the settlement of the China Incident was hinged upon domestic problems and that the key point of the domestic problems was in purification of the army.

Because of this consideration, he attempted to remove War Minister SUGIYAMA, to be succeeded by ITAGAKI and to appoint YANAGAWA the Chief of General Staff. His attempt along this line partly succeeded and partly failed, and because of it he had to resign from the Premiership. In other words, those generals such as ARAKI, MASAKI, YANAGAWA and OBATA were politically the followers of KONOE, whereas they were intimate comrades in their opposition to the China Incident as well as in their attempt to avoid occurrence of a great war.

Such being the case, I had a good reason to believe that all those which Prince KONOE had told me about those generals, not only after his return from the U.S.A. but also since the time of his First Cabinet, were the truth, and so I collected them and put them in my description.

During the period of ARAKI Education Minister, the CHUO KORONSHA published GENJI MONO-LITARI, translated from classical into present day Japanese. To this some members of the right wing blamed that the publication was an act of blasphemy since the book treated a love affair of the members of the Royal Families. They threatened the CHUO KORONSHA and made several suggestions to the Education Minister, but the Minister did not pay any attention to the suggestions. The movement of the right wing people on this problem was eagerly watched by the cultured people with a sense of much disgust. Personally I had some apprehensions over the attitude of the Education Minister, judging from his detestation of base ball, and worried for the sake of the president of the publishing company, Mr. SHIMIZU, Yuzo, who happened to be one of my personal friends.

I visited Lieutenant-General YAMAGATA who was an intimate friend of the Education Minister, and asked him what would be the attitude of the Minister toward the matter. Lieutenant-General YAMAGATA laughed and said,

"Even a Royal Member can have a love affair. It only shows that the reigning was successfully carried out, and it does not in any way spoil the dignity of the Royal Family. The matter concerns about literature, which is a production of the brilliant culture of the ago, to be treasured by the people. The Education Minister has an opinion not to prohibit publication of such treasure, and so I do not think you need worry about it." Lieutenant-General YAMAGATA reiterated on this assertion.

On other occasion, there was a time when at the Department of Economics of the Tokyo Imperial University, a group of professors of Fascistic inclination launched an expulsion agitation against professors of socialistic tendency. The agitation so developed that several professors of left wing principle seemed to be on the point of being expelled from school. I had my friends among the group of professors, and partly because I was worried on their behalf, and partly because I thought the matter overshadowed the future of scholars, I again asked the opinion of Lieutenant-General YAMAGATA.

He said, "The Education Minister is of the opinion opinion that socialism is different in principle from communism in that the former makes it a principle of respecting democracy. The Minister prefers socialism rather than Fascism, which, like communism, purports to come into power and to set up its own dictatorial regime. Such being the case, the Minister has no intention of punishing those people. I think he is intending to settle the whole affair with the minimum sacrifice of punishing one person of each party, according to the principle of 'in a quarrel both parties are to blame'." By saying this the General hinted that he had already consulted the matter with the Education Minister and had reached a decision about it.